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INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,' the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) has been
involved in some of the most challenging and compelling legal disputes
involving a federal agency. 2 Recent efforts by the Commission to rework
its rules for promoting competition in local telephone markets and to
modify its media ownership rules have resulted in extremely controversial
and closely watched cases.3 Yet a strong argument can be made that the
most significant case involving the Commission in recent history is FCCv.
NextWave Personal Communications Inc.4 The Supreme Court held in
NextWave that § 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prevented the FCC from
revoking wireless communications licenses held by NextWave 5 after the
company had bid successfully for the licenses at an agency auction and
agreed to make "full and timely payment of all monies due" to the agency,
but then defaulted on its obligation to pay. 6
A narrow view of NextWave is that the case did no more than address the
application of a single provision of the Bankruptcy Code, § 525(a), to the
unusual situation in which the Commission acted as both a regulator and
creditor of a license holder. However, this view verges on myopia because
NextWave implicated the fundamental question of the scope of the
Commission's regulatory authority. Whether the Commission's local
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
2. See, e.g., AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (rejecting a "states' rights"

challenge to the Telecommunications Act of 1996); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
535 U.S. 467 (2001) (upholding the Commission's TELRIC pricing methodology as a
reasonable exercise of agency discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA));
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 under the First Amendment).
3. See In re Review of the § 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978 (2003) (revising rules governing the unbundling

obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) under 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3)), affd
in part, rev'd in part, United States Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. United States Telecom. Ass'n, 125
S. Ct. 313 (2004). See also In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to § 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) (modifying media ownership
rules) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir.
2004).

4. 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
5. NextWave is shorthand
NextWave Power Partners Inc.,
Telecom, Inc.
6. See NextWave, 537 U.S.
NextWave and the FCC and events

for NextWave Personal Communications Inc. and
which are wholly owned subsidiaries of NextWave
at 296-97 (describing the security agreement between
leading up to the filing of NextWave's bankruptcy case).
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competition rules or its media ownership regulations survive arbitrary and
capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act 7 (APA) involves
only a familiar application of administrative law principles, admittedly in a
complicated and controverted regulatory setting.
The Commission has historically enjoyed broad discretion to act in the
public interest when making licensing decisions.8 The Commission acted
in a regulatory capacity in awarding the spectrum to NextWave based on
the company's successful bids totaling more than $4 billion on wireless
spectrum licenses and in establishing a series of regulatory conditions with
which the company had to comply in order to receive the licenses. 9 The
challenge to the Commission's authority resulted from its decision to act
As allowed by FCC regulations,
also as a creditor of NextWave.
NextWave elected to pay for its licenses in installment payments.' 0 The
Commission became a creditor of the company, taking a security interest in
the licenses and filing Uniform Commercial Code financing statements to
perfect its claims." When NextWave defaulted on its payments, the
Commission cancelled the licenses in an effort to recover them.
NextWave, in turn, sought to retain the licenses by filing for bankruptcy
protection, leading to five years of litigation12 in no less than five different
federal courts, including the Supreme Court.
The central issue in the litigation was the scope of the Commission's
regulatory authority.' 3 Did the Commission have the authority to cancel
(and thereby recover) NextWave's licenses after the company defaulted on
its installment payment? Or, was the Commission's authority restricted by
§ 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which would enable NextWave to retain
the licenses while it reorganized in bankruptcy? The Second Circuit held
that the Commission was acting as a regulator, and that the Commission's
licensing authority could not be limited by a bankruptcy court.' 4 That court
viewed NextWave's default as a breach of its obligation to act in the public

7. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) ("[R]eviewing court shall hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary and capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.").
8. See discussion infra Part I.
9. See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc.), 200 F.3d 43, 51-53 (2d Cir. 1999) aff'd 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (noting
that "Congress came to the conclusion that using market forces to allocate spectrum could
accomplish congressionally defined policy goals" and discussing "regulatory purpose" of
"payment in full requirement").
10. See NextWave, 537 U.S. at 296-97 (relating, in relevant part, the general agreement
authenticated by the Note and Security Agreements between NextWave and the FCC).
11. See id. (detailing the FCC's position as a NextWave's secured creditor).
12. See discussion infra Part 11.
13. SeeNextWave, 537 U.S. at 301.
14. See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 62 (holding that the Bankruptcy Court had "no power to
interfere with the FCC's system for allocating spectrum licenses").
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interest, thereby depriving the company of the right to retain the licenses.' 5
Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court held that the
Commission's regulatory authority was circumscribed by § 525 of the
Bankruptcy Code and that the Commission could not revoke the licenses
for failure to make a timely payment. 16 Thus, the Commission's authority
to regulate licenses issued in the public interest was subordinate to the
protections under the Bankruptcy Code available to debtors that hold
licenses.
This Article discusses the extensive litigation over the licenses issued to
NextWave as the high bidder at spectrum auctions conducted in 1996, in
which the Supreme Court ultimately held that the FCC--despite its special
governmental role of allocating spectrum licenses-should be treated in the
same way as any other creditor in bankruptcy, given the way it structured
its dealings with NextWave. Part I situates NextWave in historical context.
It describes the establishment and operation of the FCC in what we refer to
as the "public interest regime," in which the Commission enjoyed broad
discretion in making decisions, including licensing decisions, as a
regulator. Part I also discusses the emergence of a hybrid "private-public"
approach to communications regulation, in which Congress has directed the
Commission to employ market forms-requiring the use of auctions to
allocate spectrum and directing the Commission to consider installment
payment programs-to perform regulatory functions. Congress adopted
the auction approach in 1993, during a period when government agencies
increasingly embraced privatization as a means of performing public
functions.
Part II provides a history of the NextWave litigation, from the bids at the
1996 spectrum auctions to the announcement in 2004 of an agreement
between the Commission and NextWave resolving the ongoing dispute.
Part III situates NextWave in the context of other cases, notably United
States v. Winstar Corporation,17 in which courts have addressed whether
the federal government should be treated as a private party based on the
form under which the government performed its functions. Part III also
discusses the lessons learned by the Commission from the NextWave
litigation. The tension between form and function in litigation over the
"private-public approach" to regulation may be inevitable when a
regulatory agency acts in a dual capacity, and the critical question in
litigation over the agency's conduct is whether its actions are viewed as
15. See id. at 52 (holding that the "'payment in full' requirement has a regulatory
purpose related directly to the FCC's implementation of the spectrum auctions").
16. See NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 149-56 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (reasoning that, because the FCC chose to pursue a debtor-creditor relationship with
NextWave, it therefore is bound by the Bankruptcy Code), ajfd, 537 U.S. 293, 308 (2003).
17. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
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"regulatory." The use of private or market forms to perform public
functions should not necessarily subject the agency to more rigorous
scrutiny when the agency's actions are challenged in court. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court's decision in NextWave suggests that the Court accords
the agency less deference when it employs a private or market form to
perform a public function.
We conclude with a description of the resolution of the NextWave
litigation. The Commission and NextWave agreed to a settlement, in
which NextWave retained some of its licenses and returned the rest to the
FCC, and the Commission received payments for licenses that NextWave
either retained or sold. Our last lesson is a suggestion that, at a minimum,
agency counsel should embrace the private role assigned to it in the event
that the agency does not succeed in establishing in the litigation that its
actions were public or regulatory.
I. FROM THE PUBLIC INTEREST REGIME OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 TO THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC
APPROACH OF MORE RECENT FEDERAL STATUTES

A. The Public InterestRegime
We begin with a brief description of the establishment of the FCC and
the legal regime in which it first operated. The defining features of the
public interest regime are that Congress gave the Commission broad
discretion to act in the public interest, and courts generally accorded the
Commission substantial deference when evaluating the agency's actions.
The predecessor to the FCC, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), was
created by Congress in 1927 "to ration the electromagnetic spectrum and to
regulate radio broadcasters." 18 At the time the FRC was created, "AM
radio stations were spreading around the country and just beginning to link
up into networks."' 19 Consequently, "[tlhe firms broadcast through the
airwaves and so tended to interfere with each other if not legally
constrained from doing so. ''2°
Congress decided to establish an
18. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 20 (2d ed.
1998). The electromagnetic spectrum has been described as "an 'input' into the 'product' of
communicating data electronically via the ether." Id. at 39. Krattenmaker also provides a
technical definition of spectrum as "the entire available range of sinusoidal frequencies."
See id.

at 40

(quoting

DON L. CANNON

& GERALD LUECKE,

UNDERSTANDING

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 87 (2d ed. 1984)). See also Nicholas W. Allard, The New
Spectrum Auction Law, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 20 (1993) ("The radio spectrum is
composed of naturally occurring electromagnetic radiating energy... [and] is an array of
electric and magnetic rays arranged in order of their frequency measured in wavelength or
cycles.").
19.

KRATTENMAKER, supra note 18, at 22.

20. Id; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) ("Before 1927,
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independent agency to regulate the spectrum and radio broadcasters
because it believed "that an independent federal agency could develop
relevant expertise," and "that using an independent agency was the only
way to sufficiently insulate spectrum decisions from the political
process. 21
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 193422 (the
1934 Act), which, among other things, created the FCC. 23 The 1934 Act
combined two bureaucracies: the FRC and the parts of the Interstate
Commerce Commission that were responsible for regulating telephone and
telegraph companies.2 4 The general governing standard
in the 1934 Act
25
directs the Commission to act "in the public interest.,
Title III of the 1934 Act addressed the licensing of commercial radio
broadcasters-that is, "deciding who should be licensed to broadcast on
what frequencies in which communities. 26 Under the 1934 Act, no one in
the United States may broadcast over the airwaves without a license from
the federal government.27 Initially the FCC allocated spectrum licenses
through comparative hearings, in which the agency evaluated each
applicant's submission and made a28 determination as to which applicant
would best serve the public interest.
the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was
chaos.").
21.

See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS

LAW AND POLICY 58

(2001) (elaborating further that "[d]uring the time when the FRC and later the FCC were
created, there was a widespread belief that politically insulated expert administrators would
do a better job of managing complex regulatory undertakings than their masters in Congress
and the White House").
22. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
23. BENJAMIN, supra note 21, at 57.
24. KRATTENMAKER, supra note 18, at 20.
25. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) (directing the Commission when evaluating license
applications to act "in the public interest, convenience, and necessity"). See also 47 U.S.C.
§ 307(b) (2000) (addressing the allocation of facilities and the term of licenses as well as
charging the Commission with evaluating whether an application for a station license will
serve "public convenience, interest, or necessity").
26. KRATTENMAKER, supra note 18, at 22. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2000) (authorizing
the Commission to grant a license if doing so would serve "public convenience, interest, or
necessity").
27. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (allowing only persons with licenses to use or operate
devices transmitting radio signals). See also Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314, 1316
(2002) (stating that "Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to
operate a radio station without a license from the Federal Communications Commission."),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 815 (2002).
28. See BENJAMIN, supra note 21, at 85-90 (discussing the history of comparative
hearings and the criteria used to evaluate applicants). Courts generally deferred to the
licensing decisions made by the Commission in the public interest. See, e.g., Pottsville
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (noting that the Communications Act
"expresses a desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through appropriate administrative
control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission"); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329
U.S. 223, 229 (1946) (holding that the FCC, and not federal courts, had the right to
determine if a license renewal was in the public interest); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125, 145 (1939) (deferring to the FCC's determination that one company is
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The comparative hearing process used by the Commission after adoption
of the 1934 Act was ultimately criticized for the costs and delays associated
with its administration.2 9 In 1981, Congress authorized the FCC to award
initial spectrum licenses to qualified applicants through the use of a
lottery. 30 However, this method of license allocation also was criticized on
the grounds that it encouraged speculation for spectrum licenses.3'
B. The Hybrid Private-PublicApproach to Communications Regulation of
More Recent FederalStatutes
In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to award initial spectrum licenses
for certain commercial services through "a system of competitive bidding"
that is, an auction. 32 The auction method was intended to realize several
objectives: (1) "the development and rapid deployment of new
technologies, products and services," (2) "the 'recovery for the public of a
portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made available for
commercial use,"' and (3) "the efficient and intensive use of the
electromagnetic spectrum." 33 The reasoning behind the use of the auction
method is that it would quickly award licenses to the parties "who value
them most highly and who are therefore most likely to introduce service
rapidly to the public. 34 In 1997, Congress mandated the use of auctions
under the "control" of another); Yankee Network, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 219 (D.C. Cir.
1939) (affirming the FCC decision granting an application to an existing license-holder to
operate on a different frequency with increased power and dismissing protests filed by other
license-holders).
29. See Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition
of Assets: FashioningRegulatory Substitutesfor Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1705,
1735 (1999) (noting that comparative hearings "were costly, both in terms of resources and
time," and that the "open-ended nature of the [decisionmaking] criteria arguably led to the
imposition of personal preferences by the Commissioners").
30. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1242, 95
Stat. 357, 736-37 (1981) (authorizing allocation of licenses through random selection),
amended by Communications Amendment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259 § 115, 96 Stat.
1087, 1094-95 (1982) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (2000)).
31. See Krent, supra note 29, at 1735-36 (explaining that "lotteries drew fire for
precipitating a secondary auction" in which lottery winners could sell "their right to
broadcast in the open market, reaping windfalls at the expense of the public"); see also
Allard, supra note 18, at 26 (describing "application mills" that "aggressively advertise[d]
the availability of licenses and overstate[d] the chances as well as the value of winning the
lottery"); NextWave, 200 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the "huge administrative
burden" comparative hearings system placed on the FCC as well as the fact that the "use of
lotteries lessened the administrative burden, but encouraged speculation and, ultimately,
failed to allocate licenses to those most likely to use them most efficiently or beneficially").
32. See 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(1) (2000) (authorizing the use of competitive bidding).
33. See NextWave, 254 F.3d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(3)
(2000)); see also Allard, supra note 18, at 17 (noting that the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 authorizing spectrum auctions "has several ambitious goals
including: encouraging swift and efficient development of emerging communications
technologies, such as PCS; encouraging economic opportunities for small businesses and
other designated groups; and raising revenue for deficit reduction").
34. See NextWave, 254 F.3d at 134 (quoting In re Implementation of § 3096) of the
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for most future licensing proceedings.35
We view the 1993 statute establishing spectrum auctions as part of the
hybrid private-public approach to regulation because it employs a private
or market form-an auction-to perform the Commission's function of
awarding licenses. 36 In addition, the 1993 statute37 also directed the
Commission to "consider alternative payment schedules and methods of
calculation, including lump sums or guaranteed installment payments, 38 to
"avoi[d] excessive concentration of licenses"3 9 by "disseminating licenses
among a wide variety of applications, including small businesses [and]
rural telephone companies. 40 The 1993 auction law authorized the
Commission to employ private or market forms in awarding spectrum
licenses. 4 '

Congressionally-mandated use of market forms to allocate spectrum
licenses began at a time when government agencies increasingly embraced
privatization as a means of performing public functions. The literature on
privatization is extensive. 42 We are unable to offer a comprehensive
account of the rise of privatization and its reception in the courts.
Nevertheless, it is useful to note a number of general points. First,
privatization refers to a number of different arrangements between a
government agency and a private entity.43 The most common arrangement
is when a government agency contracts with a private party to perform a
Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 5,532, 5, at 5,535 (1994)); see also Krent, supra note 29,
at 1736 ("The goals of providing best service to the public and allocating the license to those
entities valuing them most should overlap, if not converge.").
35. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002, 111 Stat. 251, 258 (1997) (mandating the use of
competitive bidding in all but a few explicitly exempt circumstances).
36. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is an example of the new private-public
approach to regulation because of its principal goal of improving the provision of
telecommunications service through deregulation and competition. The 1996 Act "radically
revised prior law by both eliminating state-imposed barriers to competition and forcing
existing local exchange carriers to cooperate with potential competitive entrants. The goal
of all these provisions is the same: to facilitate, to the extent possible given the economics of
the industry, competition in the local loop." BENJAMIN, supra note 21, at 717; see also
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467,488 (2002) (describing the goal of the
1996 Act as intent to "uproot[] ...monopolies" and "jump-start" competition by providing
competitive carriers incentives to enter local retail telephone markets).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2000).
38. Id.§ 309(j)(4)(A).
39. Id.§ 309(j)(3)(B).
40. See NextWave, 537 U.S. at 296 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1), 309(j)(3)(B),
309(j)(4)(A) (2000)).
41. See 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(4)(A) (directing the Commission to consider alternative
methods of payments for licenses).
42. See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367
(2003); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1211
(2003); Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1319
(2001).
43. See Metzger, supranote 42, at 1370 (noting that "privatization can take a variety of
forms," and that "in some instances privatization represents government withdrawal from a
field of activity or from responsibility for providing services").
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task or provide a service previously performed by that agency. 44 The case
for such an arrangement is that a private party can perform the task more
efficiently; critics respond that any increase in efficiency comes at the cost
of reduced oversight and accountability. 45 The paradigmatic example is
when the government contracts with a private company for the operation of
a prison. 46 In this article, we discuss a more limited form of privatizationwhen the government employs market or private forms (in this case, an
auction) but continues itself to perform the public function (the award of
licenses).
Second, the rise of privatization has many causes. At the risk of
oversimplifying a complicated set of developments, we attribute the rise of
privatization, in part, to the enduring legacy of Ronald Reagan's
presidency.4 7 Intellectually, it coincides with the emergence of public
choice theory, which challenged the fundamental premise of the public
interest regime-that the personnel of administrative agencies were capable
of setting aside their private interests, however defined, in attempting to act
in the public interest. 48 And in the regulatory realm, the federal
government took its first steps towards deregulation-in which traditional
government command and control regulation is eschewed, and competition
in private markets is embraced-during the presidency of Jimmy Carter,
with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 4 '
This Act introduced
competition into the airline industry and, several years later, terminated the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the agency responsible for overseeing the airline
industry.5 °

44. See id. (noting that "the more common model of privatization [is] government use
of private entities to implement government programs or to provide services to others on the
government's behalf").
45. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1291-314 (2003) (discussing the arguments for and against privatization); see
also Metzger, supra note 42, at 1454 (discussing the trade-off between accountability and
efficiency).
46. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Note, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and
Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. Rev. 1868 (2002) (discussing the rise of
private prisons in the United States).
47. See Burton Yale Pines, The Ten Legacies of Ronald Reagan, POL'Y REV. (1989)
(declaring that Ronald Reagan "began the privatization of federal services and programs"),
available at http://www.policyreview.org/spring89/pines.html (last visited July 8, 2005);
see also Freeman, supra note 45, at 1293 (explaining that Ronald Reagan stressed
deregulation during his term).
48. See generally JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC CHOICE (6th ed. 1992). A seminal work in public choice theory is JAMES
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).

49. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
50. See Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. 316 (1988) (discussing the process of airline deregulation and its consequences).
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Third, although the embrace of privatization may have reduced the
government's role in performing regulatory tasks, it has not necessarily
reduced federal government activity. To the contrary, the increasing
reliance on private parties and use of market forms has contributed to the
increase in government expenditures as the federal government transacts
government "business" with private parties.5 1
Cumulatively, these developments have created a political and legal
environment in which privatization generally has been embraced, and in
which the distinction between "regulatory" and "private" in the
characterization of government action has been blurred. What would a
court do when a private party challenged governmental action that had a
regulatory purpose but was discharged in the form of a private transaction
with that party? To what extent would the government's actions receive
deference (since they were "regulatory")? And to what extent could the
private party assert that its private property rights-as documented in its
transaction with the agency-should be protected against subsequent
actions by the agency? All of these questions were implicated in the
NextWave litigation.
II. THE NEXTWA VE LITIGATION

A. The C and F Block Auctions
1. The Commission'sAuction Program
Before discussing the litigation, we set the stage by describing the
Commission's auction program. With respect to the design of the
competitive bidding system, Congress directed the Commission to, among
other things, "promot[e] economic opportunity and competition and
ensur[e] that new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to the
American people by... disseminating licenses among a wide variety of
52
applicants, including small businesses [and] rural telephone companies.,
To promote this goal, Congress instructed the FCC "to consider alternative
payment schedules and methods of calculation, including lump sums or
guaranteed installment payments.., or other schedules or methods. 5 3

51. See Metzger, supra note 42, at 1377 ("[H]istory demonstrates that increased
privatization often goes hand in hand with expansion rather than contraction in public
responsibilities.").
52. See NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B)).
53. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(A)).
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In implementing § 3090), the Commission promulgated "rules to auction
licenses for 'broadband PCS.' 54 It decided to use simultaneous, multipleround auctions. 55 The FCC complied with the statute's direction to
consider installment payments and other methods to allow small businesses
and "designated entities" to participate in the broadband PCS industry.5 6 It
divided the spectrum set aside for broadband PCS into six blocks: "three of
30 MHz each (A, B, and C) and three of 10 MHz each (D, E, and F)."57
The FCC limited participation in the "C" and "F" Block auctions to small
businesses and other designated entities and allowed small businesses that
obtained licenses at auction to pay in installments over the ten-year term of
the license.58
In order to ensure that a potential bidder was certain of its financial
capability before it participated in an auction, the FCC adopted rules
requiring prompt and complete payment. Significantly, for a bidder that
decided to pay in installments, the rules provided that any "license
granted... shall be conditioned upon the full and timely performance of
the licensee's payment obligations under the installment plan., 59 Failure to
make a timely payment would result in automatic cancellation of the
license.6 °
2. Next Wave's Participationin the C andF Block Auctions
The NextWave companies were founded in 1995 "for the purpose of

bidding on PCS licenses and operating a personal communications
service., 6 1 Although the details of the events culminating in NextWave's
decision to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection are somewhat
intricate, the basic facts are straightforward.

54. Id. Broadband PCS refers to "'personal communications services [for example,
cordless phones] in the 2 GHz band."' See id. (quoting In re Implementation of § 3090) of
1, 3, at 5,534 (1994)).
the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 5,532,
55. See In re Implementation of § 3090) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 2,348,
68, at 2,360 (1994) (expounding the belief that multiple round auctions best meet the goals
of Congress); see also High Plains Wireless, LP v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(explaining "open, simultaneous, and ascending" auctions of DEF blocks for broadband
PCS spectrum).
56. See In re Implementation of § 3090) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 2,348,
229, at 2,388-89 (1994) (deferring the decision on whether and how to use these
preferences until the development of specific competitive bidding rules in subsequent
reports and orders is completed).
57. See High Plains Wireless, 276 F.3d at 602-03.
58. See 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(a)(1) (2003). See also 9 F.C.C.R. 2,348, TT 231-40, at
2,389-91 (1994) (discussing the reasons and qualifications for installment payments);
NextWave, 254 F.3d at 134 (describing the agency's views that installment payments would
alleviate small business entities' lack of access to capital and equating installment payments
with a government extension of credit to licensees).
59. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4) (2003).
60. See id. § 1.2110(g)(4)(iv) (2003).
61. NextWave, 254 F.3d at 134.
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In 1996, NextWave participated in auctions for C-Block and F-Block
licenses, and "was awarded 63 C-Block licenses on winning bids totaling
approximately $4.74 billion, and 27 F-Block licenses on winning bids of
approximately $123 million., 62 Pursuant to the Commission's regulations,
NextWave "made a down payment on the purchase price, signed
promissory notes for the balance, and executed security agreements that the
FCC perfected by filing under the Uniform Commercial Code. 63
NextWave received the licenses, which provided that "authorization is
conditioned upon the full and timely payment of all monies due" and that
"[f]ailure to comply with this condition will result in the automatic
cancellation of this authorization. 64
After the Commission awarded the C-Block licenses, several winning
bidders, including NextWave, encountered difficulties in obtaining
financing and sought relief from the FCC. 65 "In response, the Commission
suspended installment payment obligations for C-Block licensees, and then
issued two Restructuring Orders, offering a variety of revised financing
options that allowed C-Block licensees to surrender some or all of their
licenses for full or partial forgiveness of their outstanding debt., 66 The
critical point with respect to the various restructuring orders is that they
required full payment of the amount bid.6 7
The FCC set a deadline of June 8, 1998 for a licensee to elect a
restructuring option and October 29, 1998 as the last date to make an
installment payment.68 NextWave sought a stay of the deadline from the
Commission and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.6 9 When these efforts
62. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 296 (2003).
63. Id. at 296-97; see NextWave, 254 F.3d at 134 (quoting the first paragraph of the
Security Agreement between NextWave and the FCC for the proposition that the "security
agreements gave the Commission 'a first lien on and continuing security interests in all of
the Debtor's rights and interest in [each] License').
64. Id. (quoting FCC, Radio Station Authorization for Broadband PCS 2 (issued to
NextWave Jan. 3, 1997)). Similar language appeared in the Installment Plan Note and
associated security agreements executed by NextWave. Id.
65. See NextWave, 537 U.S. at 297.
66. Next Wave, 254 F.3d at 134-35. See Next Wave, 200 F.3d at 47-48 (setting out the
details of the RestructuringOrders).
67. See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment
Financing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, 12 F.C.C.R. 16436,
19, at 16447 (1997). The Court stated:
The FCC decided that it would be contrary to the public interest to forgive a
portion of the obligations, thereby allowing bidders to keep their licenses at a
significantly reduced price, because the C-block auction had been designed to
ensure that licenses were allocated to users who could demonstrate, through their
ability to pay the highest price, that they possessed the most highly valued use for
the licenses.
NextWave, 200 F.3d at 48. See generally U.S. Airwaves, Inc. v. FCC, 232 F.3d 227, 230-31
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing restructuring orders).
68. 13 F.C.C.R. 7413-14 (1998).
69. See NextWave Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1255, 1998 WL 389116 (D.C. Cir.
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failed, NextWave filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on June 8, 1998, and on the same day, it initiated an
adversary proceeding against the FCC in which it claimed that its C-Block
license payment obligations should be avoided as a fraudulent
conveyance.70 After filing for bankruptcy, NextWave did not make another
timely payment on its licenses.
B. The Litigation in the Second CircuitOver the Jurisdictionof the
Bankruptcy Court
The ensuing litigation from NextWave's decision to file for bankruptcy
was extensive, resulting in no less than six decisions by the Bankruptcy
Court and the District Court in the Southern District of New York as well
as two decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The litigation
over NextWave's fraudulent conveyance claim presented a dispute over the
capacity in which the FCC acted when it sought to enforce the timely
payment condition agreed to by NextWave when the company received the
licenses. NextWave contended that the FCC did not enjoy a remedy that
was not available to any other creditor of the company and therefore was
limited to participating in the reorganization.7'
The FCC, on the other hand, insisted that regardless of the agency's
rights as a creditor, it was acting in a regulatory capacity when it canceled
the licenses. 72 According to the Commission, the dispute should be
governed exclusively by communications law, and the agency's public
interest determination awarding the licenses to NextWave required the
company to make timely payments.73 The Commission contended that by
failing to make the full and timely payment due, NextWave established that
its retention of the licenses was not in the public interest and
that the
74
Commission was well within its authority to cancel the licenses.
The conflicting views of the scope of the FCC's authority and of the
licenses are set out in the decisions. The Bankruptcy Court and the District
Court sided with NextWave, while the Second Circuit consistently agreed
June 11, 1998) (dismissing petition for review).
70. See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 48. As the Supreme Court summarized:
NextWave initiated an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, alleging that
its $4.74 billion indebtedness on the C-Block licenses was avoidable as a
'fraudulent conveyance' under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 544, because, by the time the Commission actually conveyed the licenses, their
value had declined from approximately $4.74 billion to less than $1 billion.
NextWave, 537 U.S. at 297-98.
71. In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999).
72. See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 54 (noting that deciding which entities are entitled to
spectrum licenses is part of the FCC's regulatory power).
73. Id.

74. Id.
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with the FCC and reversed the lower courts.75
The FCC initially moved to dismiss NextWave's complaint, which
asserted a fraudulent conveyance claim under 11 U.S.C. § 544, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.7 6 Even though NextWave had initiated the
litigation in the Bankruptcy Court, the FCC argued that the company's
claim challenged the agency's action in its regulatory capacity and that
only a federal court of appeals had jurisdiction over such claims.7 7 The
Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that two different bodies of law applied
insofar as the FCC was acting as both a creditor and a regulator in
conducting the spectrum auctions and entering into financial
arrangements-including taking a security interest-with winning
bidders.7 8 It determined that the fraudulent conveyance claim implicated
the FCC only to the extent that the agency was acting as a creditor and that
the agency therefore was subject to the bankruptcy code in the same
manner as any other creditor.7 9 Implicit in the Bankruptcy Court's
conclusion was that the licenses were property of the debtor's estate.8 °
The Second Circuit rejected this reasoning. It too recognized that the
case involved the interplay of communications law and bankruptcy law, but
81
ruled decisively that the former governed, to the exclusion of the latter.
The court of appeals rejected the notion that NextWave had a property
interest in the licenses, emphasizing that a "license does not convey a
of the
property right; it merely permits the licensee to use the portion
82
terms.
its
with
accordance
in
license
the
by
covered
spectrum

75. The district court opinion is reported in NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 241 B.R. 311 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). The citations to the bankruptcy court decisions
are collected in In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 130 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000).
76. See In re NextWave, 235 B.R. at 265. In its fraudulent conveyance claim,
NextWave asserted that its $4.74 billion obligation was avoidable as a "fraudulent
conveyance" because the obligation greatly exceeded the value of the licenses by the time
the company received them from the FCC. Id. at 269.
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 402 (2000). See also NextWave, 200 F.3d at 54 (noting that
"jurisdiction over claims brought against the FCC in its regulatory capacity lies exclusively
in the federal courts of appeals").
78. The Bankruptcy Court noted the dual role of the FCC:
Nothing in section 3090) of the FCA or any other statute confers any regulatory or
other jurisdiction upon the FCC to make rules or other determinations with respect
to its own status as a creditor . . . . By the same token, the Bankruptcy Code
expressly recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of regulatory agencies to perform
the regulatory functions conferred upon them by statute.
In re NextWave, 235 B.R. at 269.
79. See id. at 270-71.
80. See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 54-55; see also In re FCC, 217 F.3d at 132 (noting that
after initial remand from the Second Circuit, the bankruptcy court held that licenses were
property of NextWave's estate subject to the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code, located at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000)).
81. Next Wave, 200 F.3d at 54.
82. Id. at 51.
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The Court of Appeals also minimized the significance of the form of the
transactions between the Commission and NextWave. The fact that the
FCC became a creditor of NextWave when it executed a note and a security
interest with NextWave and that licenses were awarded at an auction-a
transaction that is in some respects contractual-did not limit any of the
FCC's authority in performing its core task of awarding licenses.83
Therefore, the basis for the FCC's efforts to recover the licensesNextWave's failure to make a "full and timely payment"-was a regulatory
condition with "a regulatory purpose related to the FCC's implementation
of the spectrum auctions. 8 4
Furthermore, because the purpose of the auction was to allocate
spectrum licenses and because the FCC had exclusive jurisdiction to award
and to revoke licenses, the Second Circuit concluded that the agency was
acting in a regulatory capacity in deciding to award the licenses to the
highest bidder and attempting to revoke them for failure to comply with the
agency's conditions.85 The Court of Appeals further concluded that it was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to hold that NextWave
could retain the licenses when it had failed to meet the conditions to which
the license was subject.8 6
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the spectrum auction would
generate revenue for the federal government but nevertheless credited the
FCC's explanation that the agency was not acting to maximize its "selfinterest" in auctioning spectrum licenses to the highest bidders.8 7 Noting
83. See id.at 51-52 ("[T]he broader purpose of 3090) was to create an efficient
regulatory regime based on the congressional determination that competitive bidding is the
most effective way of allocating resources to their most productive uses."); see also id at
58-59 (noting the Commission's "dual role" and stating that "the regulatory function is not
ended by the bankruptcy of a licensee or a license claimant"); In re FCC, 217 F.3d at 131
(explaining that in first appeal filed by NextWave, the court "held that even where the
regulatory conditions imposed on a license take the form of a financial obligation, the
bankruptcy and district courts lack jurisdiction to interfere in the FCC's allocation").
84. See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 52 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 24.708 (2003)). The court of
appeals credited the FCC's explanation that the "payment in full" requirement was intended
to "deter frivolous or insincere bidding." See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 52. The case also
stated:
It was important for the functioning of the auction of licenses to 'designated
entities' that the FCC's default rules and penalties be enforceable, because the FCC
relied upon them as a substitute for conducting the 'detailed credit checks' and
other forms of due diligence that otherwise would be necessary to ensure, within
the framework of a competitive auction method of spectrum allocation, that the
licenses would be awarded to the most appropriate entities.
Id. at 53.
85. See id. at 54-55 ("The FCC's auction rules promulgated under § 309(g) have
primarily a regulatory purpose to ensure that spectrum licenses end up in the hands of those
most likely to further congressionally defined objectives.").
86. Id. at 54; see id. at 46 ("We hold that the bankruptcy court had no authority ... to
interfere with the FCC's system for allocating spectrum licenses ....).
87. See NextWave, 200 F.3d at 58-60 (explaining the auction procedures).
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that Congress sought "fair and e-fficient allocation of spectrum licenses,"
the Court explained that "[t]he auction mechanism can do so only if the
bids constitute a reliable index of the bidders' commitments to exploit and
make the most of the license at issue. And this goal is served only if the
high bid entails the obligation to make good the amount bid."' 8
After the Second Circuit issued its initial opinion, there was a reprise in
the back and forth between the Bankruptcy Court and the Court of Appeals
over the FCC's decision to reject NextWave's offer, made in a plan of
reorganization, of a single lump sum to pay off "the present value of its
billions of dollars in notes., 8 9 NextWave's offer would have satisfied the
The
company's entire $4.3 billion obligation to the Commission.
Commission, however, did not accept the offer because it concluded that
NextWave's failure to make timely payments "resulted in the 'automatic
cancellation' of the licenses." 90 Instead, the FCC issued a public notice
announcing its intention to re-auction the licenses held by NextWave. 9 1
NextWave returned to the Bankruptcy Court, where it successfully
sought an order to void the public notice.92 Essentially, the Bankruptcy
Court held that the Commission's timely payment requirement did not have
a regulatory purpose. It explained that because "[n]o rational explanation
has been offered to show that timeliness has any objective other than pure
debtor-creditor economics," it concluded that the Commission was acting
only as a creditor in enforcing the timely payment requirement. 93 The
Bankruptcy Court held that it was authorized to invalidate the
Commission's public notice pursuant to the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code.9 4

In response, the FCC successfully sought a writ of mandamus from the
Court of Appeals directing the Bankruptcy Court to vacate its order
providing relief to NextWave.95 As in its earlier decision, the Second
Circuit emphasized that the FCC's timely payment condition was
regulatory and that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction over
NextWave's challenge to the FCC's regulatory actions. 96 The Second
Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Court was not authorized to act
88. Id.at 59-60.
89. See In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2000)..
90. See id (quoting the FCC's memorandum objecting to NextWave's modified
reorganization plan).
91. See id.
92. See In re NextWave Pers. Communications Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 257-58 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) (articulating three distinct reasons for granting NewWave's motion).
93. See id. at 281; see also In re FCC, 217 F.3d at 132-33 (discussing bankruptcy court
decision after remand).
94. See Next Wave, 244 B.R. at 266-68 (explaining that the automatic stay is one of the
cornerstones of the bankruptcy process). See also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
95. InreFCC,217F.3dat129, 141.
96. Id. at 137-41.
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under the automatic stay provision because of the "regulatory power"
exception set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).9 7 The Second Circuit noted that
"NextWave remains free to pursue its challenge to the FCC's regulatory
acts. 98
C. The D.C. Circuit'sDecision Construing§ 525(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code
NextWave already had filed a petition with the FCC, asking the agency
to reconsider its decision to re-auction the spectrum, by the time the Second
Circuit issued its last decision. The FCC denied that petition, prompting
NextWave to seek review in the D.C. Circuit.99 Before summarizing the
D.C. Circuit's decision, it is important to note the shift in the posture of the
litigation once it was before a federal court of appeals that unquestionably
had jurisdiction to review actions of the FCC. The principal purpose of the
Second Circuit's evaluation of whether the Commission was acting as a
regulator or a creditor with respect to NextWave was to determine whether
the Bankruptcy Court could exercise jurisdiction over the Commission's
licensing decisions. The Second Circuit concluded that because all of the
Commission's actions-from its auction awarding the spectrum licenses to
NextWave, to its cancellation of the licenses after NextWave defaulted on
its initial installment payment-were taken as part of the agency's efforts
to perform its (regulatory) licensing function, the Bankruptcy Court did not
have jurisdiction over NextWave's claims under the Bankruptcy Code.' 0
Before the D.C. Circuit, NextWave presented its claims in the form of an
APA challenge. NextWave essentially claimed that the Commission did
not act "in accordance with law" 10' by violating a number of provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code when it cancelled NextWave's licenses subsequent to
its bankruptcy filing. Significantly, NextWave advanced a claim that had
not been substantially addressed in the litigation in the Second Circuit, that
the Commission violated § 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which prevents
a governmental entity "from revoking debtors' licenses solely for failure to
pay debts dischargeable in bankruptcy."'' 0 2 NextWave's argument under
97. Id.at 138. See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2000).
98. InreFCC,217F.3d at 140.
99. See In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., Order on Reconsideration, 15
F.C.C.R. 17,500 (2000).
100. See In re FCC, 217 F.3d at 134-41 (explaining the differences between the
regulatory aspects of timely payment compared to full payment as well as the implications
for jurisdiction).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
102. See NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir.
2001). See also 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2000). The bankruptcy court concluded that the
Commission violated § 525(a). NextWave, 244 B.R. at 269-70. The Second Circuit did not
address the merits of the bankruptcy court's § 525(a) finding. NextWave, 200 F.3d 43 (2d
Cir. 1999).
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§ 525(a) challenged the scope of the Commission's regulatory authority. If
NextWave prevailed, it would be able to avoid the FCC's cancellation of
the licenses and to retain the licenses while the company reorganized in
bankruptcy.
In the D.C. Circuit, the Commission initially asserted that NextWave's
claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 10 3 The Commission
argued that the Second Circuit decisions had already resolved all of the
claims raised by NextWave in the Commission's favor. 10 4 The D.C.
Circuit, however, did not agree-with the exception of the FCC's claim
that its actions were permitted under the regulatory power exception to the
automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-and concluded
that the
' 10 5
Second Circuit's decision was primarily "jurisdictional."
The D.C. Circuit proceeded to address the merits of NextWave's § 525
claim. Section 525 provides that a governmental unit may not "revoke" a
license "solely because" a "debtor has not paid a debt that is dischargeable
in the case under this title.' 1 6 The D.C. Circuit held that § 525 of the
Bankruptcy Code did not permit cancellation of NextWave's licenses.' 0 7 It
rejected the FCC's argument that § 525 should be read in light of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(4), which exempts the exercise of regulatory power from the
automatic stay provision available to the debtor. 10 8 The Court concluded
that reading a comparable stay provision into § 525 would be inconsistent
with the plain language of that statute. 0 9 The D.C. Circuit also rejected the
Commission's contention that § 525 did not apply because NextWave's
license fee obligation was not a "dischargeable" debt principally on the
grounds that the agency's interpretation would have written an exception
into the statute that did not exist and therefore was contrary to the plain
language of § 525.110

The D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that cancellation of NextWave's
licenses had not occurred "solely because" of the company's failure to pay
a debt within the meaning of § 525.1"1 The court recognized that the
purpose of the cancellation was to ensure the integrity of the auction
process and select licensees that would most likely use the spectrum
103.

See NextWave, 254 F.3d at 142.

104. See id. at 142-43.
105. See id. at 142-49 (explaining that the Second Circuit did not "actually and
necessarily" decide whether § 525 and § 1123 allow for the license cancellation).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2000).
107. See NextWave, 254 F.3d at 149-56 (articulating the court's reasoning).
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2000) (defining exceptions to the automatic stay
provision).
109. See NextWave, 254 F.3d at 150 ("[N]othing in § 525 or § 362 states that § 525 is
subject to subsection 362(b)(4)'s regulatory power exception, or that the exception should
be read to limit § 525's clear reach.").
110. Id.at 152.
111. Id.at 153-54.
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efficiently for public benefit.) 2 The D.C. Circuit nevertheless concluded
that such a regulatory "motive" was not sufficient because the triggering
event for canceling the licenses was NextWave's failure to pay.13
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that in structuring its
transaction with NextWave, the FCC became a creditor and therefore4
should be treated in the same way as any other creditor under § 525."1
Accordingly, the court held that "section 525 prevents the Commission,
whatever its motive, from canceling the licenses of winning bidders who
fail to make timely installment payments while in Chapter 11."155
D. The Supreme Court's DecisionAffirming the D.C. Circuit
The Commission appealed the D.C. Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari." 6 On the merits, the Supreme Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit in an 8-1 decision emphasizing the plain language
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the FCC's
of § 525.'
argument that § 525 did not apply because the Commission had a "valid
regulatory motive" for its actions.' '8 According to Justice Scalia, "[s]ection
525 means nothing more or less than that the failure to pay a dischargeable
debt must alone be the proximate cause of the cancellation-the act or
event that triggers the agency's decision to cancel, whatever the agency's
ultimate motive in pulling the trigger may be."'' 19 To read an exception into
the statute for having a "valid regulatory purpose," Justice Scalia
to the "clear[]" and "express[]" language of
suggested, would be contrary
20
Code.'
Bankruptcy
the
The Court similarly rejected the Commission's argument that
NextWave's license obligations were not debts dischargeable in
bankruptcy.' 21 Citing the broad definition of "debt" and the terms used to
define it (in particular "claim," which "has 'the broadest available
definition'), the Court concluded that "a debt is a debt, even when the

112. See id. at 154-56. The court acknowledged that "allowing NextWave to retain its
licenses may be 'grossly unfair' but that "[a]ny unfairness . . . was inherent in the
Commissioner's decision to employ a licensing scheme that left its regulatory actions open
Id. at 154-55.
to attack under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy code ....
113. NextWave, 254 F.3d at 153-54.
114. See id. at 133 ("The Commission, having chosen to create standard debt obligations
as part of its licensing scheme, is bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such
obligations in bankruptcy.").
115. Id. at 155.
116. See FCC v. NextWdave, 535 U.S. 904 (2002).
117. See NextWave, 537 U.S. at 293.
118. Seeid. at301.
119. Id. at 301-02.
120. Id at 302 (noting that when Congress has intended to provide such regulatory
exceptions for agencies it has "clearly" and "expressly" done so).
121. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 302-04.
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obligation to pay it also is a regulatory condition., 122 The Court also
rejected the argument that NextWave's obligations were not
"dischargeable" in bankruptcy because Bankruptcy Courts did not have
jurisdiction to "alter or modify regulatory obligations" on the grounds that
such an exception could only be provided expressly by statute.123
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that upholding the D.C.
Circuit's interpretation of § 525 would conflict with the Communications
Act.1 24 The Court's interpretation, according to Justice Scalia, "does not..
• obstruct the functioning of the auction provisions of 47 U.S.C. 309(j),
since nothing in those provisions demands that cancellation be the sanction
for failure to make agreed-upon periodic payments."' 25 The Court
dismissed the Commission's efforts in its auction program to satisfy
Congress's instruction to disseminate licenses among a wide variety of
applicants and to ensure the swift allocation of licenses as nothing more
' 126
than "a policy preference."
Justice Breyer dissented. In his view, the majority erred in relying
"exclusively upon the literal meaning" of § 525 without considering the
purpose of the statute.127 He asserted that the better reading of § 525
limited its scope "to instances in which a government's license revocation
is related to the fact that the debt was dischargeable in bankruptcy.' 28 This
interpretation ensured that entities that are, or were, in bankruptcy would
1 29
not be discriminated against for that reason.'
Justice Breyer argued that the majority's reading of § 525 created the
anomalous situation that the government would not have the ability to
repossess its product (the license) even though it had a security interest in
122. Id. at 303. The Court explained that under the Bankruptcy Code, a "debt" means
"liability on a claim." Id. at 302.
123. See id. at 303.
124. See id. at 304.
125. Id.
126. See NextWave, 537 U.S. at 304 (elaborating that "such administrative preferences
cannot be the basis for denying respondent rights provided by the plain terms of the law").
Justice Stevens issued a brief opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Id. at 308. He explained that although he agreed with Justice Breyer's "view that the literal
text of a statute is not always a sufficient basis for determining the actual intent of
Congress," he nevertheless believed that the majority's interpretation of the statute
"produce[d] the correct answer" in this case. Id. at 310. Justice Stevens elaborated that, in
his view, "application of the general rule [of section 525(a)] will not be unfair to the [FCC]
either as a regulator or as a creditor." Id. at 309. As to the former, "[i]f the bankrupt
licensee is unable to fulfill other conditions of its license, the regulator may cancel the
licenses for reasons that are not covered by § 525 (a)." Id. at 309-10. As to the latter,
"given the fact that the Commission has a secured interest in the license, if the licensee can
obtain the financing that will enable it to perform its obligations in full, the debt will
ultimately be paid." Id.
127. Id. at 311 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
128. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 311.
129. See id. at 313-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the statute's title, "Protection
against Discriminatory Treatment," to explain the legislative history of the statute).
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that product and even though every other private commercial seller enjoyed
the right to repossess in the same situation.' 30 In addition, Justice Breyer
noted that the majority decision frustrated legitimate debt collection efforts,
and permitted the following perverse result: a company could promise "to
pay for a public asset, go into bankruptcy, avoid the payment obligation,
and keep the asset."''
III. NEXTWA VE AND LITIGATION IN THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC REGIME
A. Litigation in the Private-PublicRegime

As privatization of governmental functions has increased, it has been
accompanied by litigation over the government's decision to privatize.
When the government employs a private or market form to accomplish a
regulatory function, the central question raised in litigation over the
government's actions is whether the government is entitled to deferential
treatment because it is acting in a public or regulatory capacity.
Placing the functions performed by the federal government on a
spectrum may prove helpful. Ordinary procurement contracts-"humdrum
supply contracts," such as a contract "to buy food for the army"--occupy
one end of the spectrum. 132 In litigation over procurement contracts, the
government is treated essentially the same way as a private party in a
commercial contract.133 On the other end of the spectrum are sovereign
acts, such as taxation-a paradigmatic example of the government acting
exclusively in a regulatory capacity. 134 In the middle of the spectrum are
cases in which the federal government acts in a hybrid, or dual, capacity.
The leading Supreme Court case on whether the federal government may
be treated as a private party is United States v. Winstar Corp.,13 1 in which

the Court upheld claims asserted by three savings and loan institutions for
breach of regulatory contract.136 The thrifts claimed that during the 1980s,
when the savings and loan industry was troubled, they acquired ailing
130. See id. at 312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority's interpretation
indicates that "a government cannot ever enforce a lien on property that it has sold on an
installment plan as long as (1) the property is a license, (2) the buyer has gone bankrupt, and
(3) the government wants the license back solely because the buyer did not pay for it").
131. See id. at 317 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REv.
390, 399-400 (2003) (explaining that "[b]y allowing companies to hoard valuable public
assets in bankruptcy, the Court opened the door to the greater strategic use of Chapter 11
filings" and that "[u]nder NextWave, companies can effectively purchase options on
considerable public assets, lock up these resources to prevent competition, and enhance their
own creditworthiness by, paradoxically, using bankruptcy as a value-enhancing asset").
132. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 880 (1996).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 839.
136. Id.at 843.
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savings and loan institutions in exchange for favorable regulatory treatment
from industry regulators. 137 In exchange for acquiring troubled thrifts and
relieving the relevant regulatory agencies of the obligation to deal with
those thrifts, the acquirers asserted that they received a promise from the
regulators that they could use a particular accounting treatment (known as
"supervisory goodwill") for the transaction. Furthermore, the acquirers
asserted that Congress breached this contract by enacting the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989.138
Among other things, FIRREA accelerated the
phase out of supervisory
39
goodwill for regulatory accounting purposes.'
In Winstar, the United States contended that the federal government was
excused from liability for breach of contract because of defenses available
to it as a sovereign. 140 The government's principal argument was that the
agreements with the acquirers were not "unmistakably clear" restrictions on
future regulatory authority and that the thrifts therefore assumed the risk of
regulatory change. 14 The government also asserted that FIRREA was a
"public and general" act and that the Sovereign Acts doctrine, excused it
1 42
from breach of contract liability.
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the United States' arguments and
issued a 7-2 decision in Winstar upholding the lower courts' decisions that
the government was liable for breach of contract. 143 Significantly, Justice
Souter's plurality opinion emphasized that, in its dealings with the
acquirers, the thrift agencies were no different from private parties in
offering favorable regulatory treatment to acquirers in exchange for
relieving the government of its obligations to troubled savings and loan
institutions.144 The United States asserted that the regulators acted in a
137.
138.

Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860-71.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12

U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).

139. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 856-58; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes,
GovernmentalLiabilityfor Breach of Contract, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 313, 360-64 (1999)
(detailing the accounting techniques employed .by the savings and loan industry in their
dealings with regulators in the 1980s).
140. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860.
141. See id. at 871-87; see also Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec.
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51 (1986) (discussing the unmistakablity defense).
142. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 891-904 (concluding that FIRREA was not a "public and
general act" in rejecting sovereign acts defense); see also Horowitz v. United States, 267
U.S. 458, 461 (1925) (articulating "public and general" requirements for sovereign acts
doctrine).
143. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843. Despite the 7-2 vote, there was no majority opinion
for the Court. Id. Justice Souter's plurality opinion was joined in full by Justices Stevens
and Breyer and in part by Justice O'Connor. Id. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion was
joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg
dissented. See Joshua Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of Congruence
in Government Contracts Law, 26 PuB. CONT. L.J. 481 (1997) (summarizing the Court's
decision in Winstar).
144. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843, 860, 870-71, 887, 896, 904.
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regulatory capacity in their initial dealings with the thrifts and that
Congress also acted in a regulatory capacity in reforming the industry's
accounting rules. The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the
government acted in a private capacity-a conclusion based, in part, upon
employed a private law form (a contract) in its
the fact that the government
45
dealings with the thrifts. 1
B. Lessons from NextWave About Litigation in the Private-PublicRegime
Nearly ten years after the Supreme Court's decision, it is difficult to
discern the reach of Winstar.146 Winstar arose in a different context than
NextWave because the private parties in Winstar sought only compensation
for regulatory change and did not attempt to prevent the government from
implementing the new regulatory regime. Winstar, however, is analogous
to NextWave for at least two reasons. First, the government acted in a
hybrid capacity in its dealings with the acquiring thrifts; according to the
Supreme Court, savings and loan regulators employed a private or market
law form (a contract) to enlist private parties in the performance of a public
function (dealing with troubled thrifts). 147 Second, when an entity
challenges governmental actions in court, the court ultimately treats the
regulatory agency like a private party and does not afford the agency
deference for actions the government characterizes as regulatory. Had the
Supreme Court agreed with the United States that it acted in a regulatory
capacity when Congress accelerated the phase out of the promised
regulatory accounting treatment, it almost certainly would have entered
judgment 48for the government on the basis of one of its sovereign
defenses. 1
NextWave similarly illustrates how the government acts in a hybrid, or
dual, capacity when it employs private law forms to perform public
functions. On one hand, in performing the public function of awarding
spectrum licenses, the Commission must act in the "public interest., 149 It
145. Id. at 843 (framing the issue as "the enforceability of contracts between the
Government and participants in a regulated industry" and holding that "the terms assigning
the risk of regulatory change to the Government are enforceable, and that the Government is
therefore liable" for breach of contract).
146. See Joshua Schwartz, The Status of the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability
Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1177 (2000)
(attempting to determine how courts have interpreted Winstar).
147. Whether the acquiring savings and loan institutions actually conferred a benefit
upon the government has been challenged in the academic literature. See Fischel & Sykes,
supra note 139, at 313, 380 (criticizing Winstar for incorrect economic analysis, which led
the Supreme Court to an incorrect decision).
148. Professors Fischel and Sykes, for example, contend that "[t]he Supreme Court
should have ruled against the complaining thrifts." Id. at 365 (explaining that "the Court
could have held that the powers to regulate the safety and soundness of financial institutions
[are] inalienable").
149. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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remains the case that "public law notions of deference to agency action"
apply to judicial review of actions taken by the agency in its regulatory
capacity. 150 Deferential judicial review provides the agency with the
flexibility to respond to changed circumstances and enables the agency to
take a pragmatic approach to regulation.
On the other hand, in awarding the spectrum through an auction and
becoming a creditor of NextWave, the Commission employed a market or
private law form with the company. In the wake of NextWave, an agency's
use of private law forms result in the risk that courts will not defer to the
agency's actions, even those taken to perform a public function. Professor
Jody Freeman has noted, for example, that the use of contracts as an
administrative regulatory tool "may impose great pressure on courts to
reconcile principles of private contract law, which do not necessarily afford
agencies deference, with principles of administrative law, which do." 151 In
cases in which private law principles govern, the emphasis is not on the
goal of the government's program but instead on the terms of its
transaction with the private party. This approach is more protective of the
private party's reliance interest and may provide a bright-line rule for
resolving disputes between the government and the private party. 15 2 To put
it succinctly, in the Supreme Court's decisions in Winstar and NextWave,
form has trumped function.
Hence our first lesson from the NextWave litigation: If an agency elects
to employ private law forms to perform public functions, it should
anticipate the possibility of litigation over its use of those forms.
Furthermore, the legal challenge may not be limited to an administrative
law challenge in a federal court of appeals.1 53 The agency's use of a private
law form may result in its being sued in another court-such as a
Bankruptcy Court or the Court of Federal Claims-instead of or in addition
to the federal court of appeals where an administrative law challenge is
heard. Such courts may be less familiar with, and therefore less committed
154
to, traditional administrative law principles.
150.

See Jody Freeman. The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 155,207 (2000);

see also Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for AdministrativeLaw in The ContractingState, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 215, 239 (2000) (commenting on the Freeman article and suggesting
"that although administrative law doctrine rarely explicitly recognizes the contract as a
regulatory mechanism, that doctrine includes understandings that allow for the use of
contracts as a regulatory mechanism").
151. Freeman, supra note 150, at 158.
152. See generally William N. Eskridge, Relationships Between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 21-22
(1998) (discussing differences between formalist and functionalist methodologies).
153. A petition for review of an FCC order must be filed in a federal court of appeals.
47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2000). An appeal of an FCC order must be
filed in the D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2000).
154. The irony of the results in the NextWave litigation is not lost on us. The Second
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Regardless of the forum in which the agency is sued, the crucialperhaps controlling-issue in the litigation is whether the agency's actions
are classified as "regulatory." Moreover, although the agency may act in a
dual capacity, the characterization of the government's actions is likely to
be an "either-or" determination.' 55 In the NextWave litigation, the
Commission prevailed when the Second Circuit determined that the FCC
acted in a regulatory capacity and that the agency possessed the regulatory
authority to cancel the licenses.
At the time NextWave defaulted on its initial installment payment, its
only obligation-both financial and regulatory-was to make a timely
payment. NextWave was obligated to build out its telecommunications
network over the course of its installment plan. 156 However, at the time its
first installment payment was due, it did not have to meet any of the buildout requirements. The Commission had no other basis for determining
whether NextWave in fact was complying with its public interest obligation
to rapidly deploy spectrum and develop services. Before the Supreme
Court, this question was raised principally in the dispute over whether the
sole cause of the FCC's decision to terminate the licenses was due to
NextWave's failure to pay its dischargeable debt. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court ruled against the Commission on this question. 15 7 However, the
Commission did not have merely a "regulatory motive" in canceling
NextWave's licenses after the company missed its initial installment
payment.
Because the auction was the mechanism used by the
Commission to award the spectrum licenses to NextWave, any steps by the
Commission to enforce NextWave's public interest obligation after the
company received the licenses required the Commission to act as both a
regulator responsible for ensuring the widespread deployment and rapid
development of spectrum in the public interest, and a creditor due to the
Circuit-probably the forum in which the most sophisticated commercial law disputes are
litigated-consistently reversed the bankruptcy court because it viewed that court's actions
as an intrusion on the Commission's regulatory authority. Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit,
known for its expertise in administrative law, held that the Commission's order violated a
provision of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore should be set aside under the APA.
155. As Professor Freeman has observed in a related context:
[C]ourts have struggled with the conflict between government as regulator and
government as contractor, drawing sharp lines between the two. They have
consistently approached government's use of contract by categorizing the nature of
the government intervention as either regulatory or contractual and according the
government deference when it acts in its regulatory capacity.
Freeman, supra note 150, at 208.
156. See 47 C.F.R. § 24.203(a) (2003) (describing five-year and ten-year build out
requirements for C block licenses); see also 47 C.F.R. § 24.203(b) (2003) (requiring a fiveyear build out for F block licenses).
157. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 301-02 (holding that
the government's "motive" was "irrelevant" when § 525 of the statute refers to a failure to
pay debt as the sole cause of cancellation).

HeinOnline -- 57 Admin. L. Rev. 710 2005

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[57:3

structure of its transaction with NextWave. The Supreme Court could
if it construed the term "solely" in section
arrive at the result that it did only
158
"proximate."
mean
to
525(a)
That the Commission acted in a dual capacity when it cancelled
NextWave's licenses for default on the payment obligation is reinforced by
the fact that the subject of the transaction, the spectrum, itself had a dual
function. As the necessary asset for NextWave's business dealings, it also
was the means by which the public interest in the use of spectrum for
wireless service would be deployed. This distinguishes NextWave from
other cases under § 525(a), in which the principal determination is whether,
focusing exclusively upon the dealings between the agency and the
licensee, there is a sufficiently distinct public purpose to the agency's
decision to deny or revoke a license. 159 When NextWave defaulted, it
failed to meet the only regulatory obligation it was required to satisfy at the
time payment was due, and the Commission had no other means to
determine whether the company60was meeting its public interest obligation
to rapidly deploy the spectrum. 1
To reiterate our first lesson: In litigation over the capacity in which the
government is acting when it employs a market mechanism or private law
form to accomplish a public function, it is essential for an administrative
agency to establish that it is exercising its regulatory authority in order to
receive the deference necessary to prevail in the litigation.

158. Id.
159. See, e.g., In re Stoltz v. Brattleboro Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 80, 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that a public housing agency may not deny continued occupancy in public housing

based upon nonpayment of past rent).
160. With respect to the clash between communications law and the Bankruptcy Code,
one commentator has proposed a way in which the two regimes could coexist:
The jurisdiction of the FCC in bankruptcy proceedings should be defined by its
The FCC is competent to regulate use of the
regulatory competence.
electromagnetic spectrum by bankrupt licensees, and bankruptcy and district courts

should respect the FCC's jurisdiction in this area. However, enforcing promissory
notes against debtors in bankruptcy is beyond the FCC's regulatory competence.
Nicholas J. Patterson, Comment, The Nature and Scope of the FCC's Regulatory Power in
the Wake of the NextWave and GWIPCS Cases, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1373, 1398 (2002). This
proposal, however, offers no more middle ground than that permitted by the Supreme
Court's decision in NextWave, at least under the facts of that case. Id.NextWave was not
using the electromagnetic spectrum when it entered into bankruptcy and had defaulted on its
only "regulatory" obligation-to make an installment payment-to the agency. Moreover,
this recommendation does not account for the fact that in its dealings with NextWave, the
commission acted in a dual capacity, as both the regulator responsible for allocating
spectrum, and as a creditor with a security interest in the licenses. Accordingly, its area of
regulatory competence was completely coextensive with its interests as a creditor. In the
litigation, no court could accommodate both of the agency's roles. One legal regime had to
prevail, and the Supreme Court ultimately decided that it would be that of the Bankruptcy
Code.
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The second lesson is related and is advice offered to both the agency
client as well as the agency counsel, with the goal of avoiding litigation. In
the current embrace of privatization government actors must exercise care
in deciding what tasks they want to perform through private law or market
forms, and how they do so. (The Commission, for example, continues to
conduct spectrum auctions, but has terminated its installment payment
program.) 161 In a perfect world, government agencies would receive
express guidance from Congress on the scope and standard of judicial
review when the agency is required to employ a private law form to
perform a public function. 62 Absent guidance from Congress, the agency
must exercise care in how it structures a transaction with a private party, as
the form of that transaction may dictate the judicial determination of
whether the agency acted in a private or a public capacity and therefore
whether the agency receives deference when its actions are reviewed in
court. For example, in connection with § 525(a), the agency could adopt a
"multi-factor inquiry" that would incorporate regulatory objectives into the
transaction63 with the private party responsible for accomplishing a public
function. 1
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in NextWave limited the Commission to
acting in a single capacity-that of creditor-in its dealings with the
company. The Commission embraced that role, even retaining outside
counsel and financial advisors to assist the agency in the negotiations with
NextWave. In April 2004, the Commission reached a settlement agreement
with NextWave, which was approved by the Bankruptcy Court in May
2004.164 The settlement immediately made available for other uses much
161. See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment
Financing for Pers. Communication Services Licensees, 13 F.C.C.R 15,743, 15,769-70 50
(1998). The FCC suspended the installment payment program even before the NextWave
litigation began because it foresaw that its statutory goal of speeding "service to the public
cannot be achieved when licenses are held in abeyance in bankruptcy court." Id.
162. Cf NextWave, 537 U.S. at 302 (stating that "where Congress has intended to
provide regulatory exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it has done so clearly
and expressly").
163. William J. Perlstein and Kenneth A. Bamberger, At the Intersection of Regulation
and Bankruptcy: FCC v. NextWave, 59 Bus. LAW. 1, 21 (2003). The authors propose the
following:
Because the inquiry would include a number of elements-such as the financial
health of the licensee and the successful use of the licensed resource-any resulting
cancellation should not be attributed 'solely' to one cause in the matter proscribed
by § 525. Similarly, by scheduling the assessment periodically, revocations would
not be attributable to a nonpayment trigger.
Id.
164. See Bloomberg News, Technology Briefing Telecommunications: NextWave
Settlement Approved, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at C5.
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of the spectrum that had been tied up in litigation since NextWave declared
bankruptcy in 1998.
The FCC pursued three overarching goals in settling the case: putting
the NextWave spectrum that lay dormant for so long to active use,
recouping value from NextWave for the U.S. government and facilitating a
final resolution to the entire matter within the context of the Supreme
Court's NextWave opinion. Specifically, the agreement provided for the
immediate return of spectrum licenses that accounted for at least 90 percent
of NextWave's spectrum (when licenses already sold to Cingular Wireless
were taken into account); contemplated total cash recovery (including
NextWave's down payment) of $1.6 billion if anticipated sales occur;
enabled a total cash and spectrum recovery of at least $4 billion based on
NextWave's original purchase price; required additional cash payments to
the U.S. Treasury, if the value and sale of the spectrum that NextWave
retained dramatically increased; extinguished any potential claims for
damages against the FCC and the U.S. government; built in safeguards to
ensure prompt and timely payment by NextWave; and avoided the use165of
debt instruments, which could have resulted in further default and delay.
Our last lesson, therefore, is a suggestion that agency counsel embrace
the private role assigned to the agency in the event that a reviewing court
deems the agency's actions to be public or regulatory. Acting with zeal to
maximize the government's recovery when the government is acting in a
proprietary capacity is entirely in the public interest.

165. See Press Release, FCC Announces NextWave Settlement Agreement (Apr. 20,
The
2004), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-246284A1.pdf.
settlement agreement also provided for a $10 million payment by NextWave to the
Commission to reimburse the agency for costs incurred in retaining outside counsel and
financial advisors. Id. The Commission actually recovered approximately $1.68 billion in
cash: $500 million on NextWave's initial deposit; $714 million in payments resulting from
Cingular's purchase of former NextWave licenses; $398 million in payments resulting from
the sale of former NextWave licenses to Verizon Wireless and MetroPCS; and $71 million
resulting from another sale of former NextWave licenses to Verizon Wireless. See also
"NextWave Outlines Reorganization Plan," International Telecommunications Intelligence
(Nov. 9, 2004), 2004 WLNR 12930006 (noting additional payment of $71 million by
Verizon Wireless).
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